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STATE OF U'rAH 
LOLA H. MITCHELL, 
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GARY A. MITCHELL, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
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Attorney for Respondent 
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LOLA H. 
vs.' 
GARY A. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MITCHELL, I 
Plaintiff and I 
Respondent, 
I 
Case No. 
MITCHELL, I 
Defendant and 
Appellant. I 
16137 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
An action of divorce was filed by the Respondent and 
first heard by the Court on April 28, 1976, and resulted in 
the Lower Court granting a Decree of Divorce to both of the 
parties, which Decree was issued by the Court on January 6, 
1976. 
That the Respondent has caused several hearings to 
be heard by a number of Lower Court Judges and several of the 
interim Lower Court Orders have been appealed to the Supreme 
Court of Utah, including the Supreme Court Case No. 15790, 
which.was pending before the Supreme Court of Utah. 
The present appeal before this Court is based upon 
an Order entered by the Honorable L. Kent Bachman on or about 
the 17th day of August, 1978, and again on the 31st day of 
August, 1978, wherein the Court entered an Order·affecting 
the property awarded to the Appellant herein. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant seeks reversal of the Judgment of the 
Lower District Court for the previously rendered Judgment in 
this matter. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
That on or about June 12, 1978, the Appellant did file 
an Order to Show Cause In Re Modification of Decree of Divorce 
entered on or about January 6, 1976, requesting a modification 
of the custody order of said Decree, and said Order to Show 
Cause having been served upon the Plaintiff on or about 
July 19, 1978, by the Dallas County Sheriff. (R-369} That 
said Order to Show Cause provided for ·hearing on 
August 31, 1978, at 2:00 p.m. (TR-1) That on or about 
August 15, 1978, Counsel for Defendant served a Notice of 
Withdrawal of Counsel on the Respondent's Attorney, together 
with a letter in which said counsel indicated he had received 
word from the Appellant, that he had left the State and no 
longer required the services of said counsel. (R-364} 
That on or about August· 17, 1978, the Attorney for 
the Respondent filed an Affidavit and Ex Parte Motion indicatin 
that the Appellant had not· returned the children to the 
. . 
Respondent·, and on information and belief, the Appellant had 
sold his home in Weber County and was no longer personally 
present within the State of Utah. (R-364-365) 
That 'the. Utah Supreme Court- on a decision dated April 23, 
1979, case number 15790 affirmed the decision of the Lower 
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L 
Court holding that title to the property (the subject matter 
of this appeal} was vested in the Appellant (Husband} sub-
ject to the lien of the Respondent (wifel. 
That said Affidavit and Ex Parte Motion further stated: 
~s near as can be determined, Defendant 
(appellant} continues to own an interest 
in real property in Davis County from which 
he draws income and in which Plaintiff 
has an interest. That with Defendant being 
out of the State and unwilling to manage 
the property, the property should be subject 
to lis pendens and the income from the 
property should be deposited with the Clerk 
of Utah Court, first for payment of the 
child support, second, for payment of the 
$20,000.00 lien and the Plaintiff, and 
third, to insure the return of said children 
to the custody of the Plaintiff. That in 
the event the Court deems it appropriate 
for a lis pendens and order requiring the 
rental to be paid in to the Clerk of the 
Court, that there also be issued a Bench 
Warrant against the Defendant for his interference 
with the custody of the children and for 
his wilful failure to comply with the appro-
priate orders of the Court. (R-365} 
That there was no evidence to show the Appellant was 
unwilling to manage said property and no evidence to demonstrate 
that the Appellant continued to own said property. 
That pursuant to said Affidavit and Ex Parte .Motion, the 
Court did enter an Order on or about August 17, 1978, wherein 
a Lis Pendens was placed upon the property located in Davis 
County, and that the proceeds from the rental of said property 
were to be paid to the Clerk of the Court for deposit into a 
separate account for which th,e purpose _was the payment of 
child support and to retire the lien presently existing in 
-3-
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the Plaintiff. (R-3631 
That on August 31, 1978, the Honorable L. Kent Bachman 
did grant the Respondent's Motion to continue the hearing 
on modification of the Decree concerning child custody, 
and did make permanent the Order of August 17, 1978, concerning 
the property awarded to the Appellant pursuant to the 
Decree of Divorce despite the fact that the Appellant 
was not present nor represented by Counsel. (R-369) 
The Order of the Court of August 31, 1978, further 
provided that the property in Davis County was assigned 
to a conservator as to all rents, proceeds, and income 
from said property, and such are to be used for the benefit 
of retiring the $20,000.00 lien heretofore imposed by 
the Court, paying child support arrearage of $800.00 as 
of August 31, 1978, and payment of attorney fees for this 
hearing in the amount of $250.00 (R370J 
That the Appellant did subsequently seek reconsideration 
and review of the Order of August 31, 1978, and on or about 
September 29, 1978, before the Honorable L. Kent Bachman, 
the Court did consider the Appellant's Motion to amend 
the Dec~ee of Divorce concerning a property description 
. . 
artd to further consider the appropriateness of the Lis 
Pendens. with said Lis Pendens and Conservationship Order 
remaining in effect. 
-4-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ORDER OF THE COURT IMPOSING A LIS PENDENS AGAINST THE 
PROPERTY OF THE APPELLANT IS INVALID. 
That U.C.A., 78-40-1, et seq., provides the methodology 
and the basis for the filing of a Lis Pendens. 
That U.C.A., 78-40-1, provides as follows: 
An action may be brought by any person 
against another who claims an estate or 
interest in real property or an interest 
or claim to personal property adverse to 
him, for the purpose of determining such 
adverse claim. 
That U.C.A., 78-40-2, as pertinent herein provides: 
In any action affecting the title to, or 
the right of possession of, real property, 
the Plaintiff at the time of filing the 
Complaint or thereafter, and the Defendant 
at the time of filing his Answer when affirmative 
relief is claimed in such Answer, or at 
any time afterward, may file for records 
with the Recorder of the County in which 
the property or some part thereof is situated 
a Notice of the pendency of the action, 
pertaining to names of the parties, the 
object of the action or defense, and the 
description of the property in that County 
.affected thereby. 
That the Respondent has not claimed title to such 
property but merely a lien in the sum of $20,000.00 as 
se.t fort!'i in the . Second Amended Decree of. D_i vorc.e Nunc Pro . 
Tune. (R-389) 
The Utah Supreme Court in Hansen vs. Kohler, 550 P·. 2d 
186 (Utah, 1976) held the sole purpose of a Lis Pendens is to 
give constructive notice of the pending of a proceeding anq 
.,..5_ 
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that the foundation for the Lis Pendens is the action itself, 
Further, that as provided by u.c.A., 78-40-2, and the 
Courts decision in Hansen vs. Kohler, cited supra, such 
filing of a Lis Pendens has the effect of giving constructive 
notice to any interested purchaser in such property and such 
purchaser would purchase such property at his own risk and 
has thus deprived the Appellant of his right of alienation 
of such property. 
POINT II 
THE APPOINTMENT OF A CONSERVATOR BY THE COURT DOES NOT CONFORM 
TO STATUTE. 
That U.C.A., 75-5-401, et seq., sets forth the provisions 
for protection of property of person under disability and 
minor. 
That u.c.A., 75-5-401, provides as follows: 
PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS - (1) Upon petition and 
after notice and hearing in accordance with 
the provisions of this part, the Court may 
appoint· a conservator or make other protective 
order for cause as follows:*** 
That the notice provisions are set forth in U. C .A. , ~ 
and provides that upon a petition for the appointment of a conser 
vator·or·other protective order, the person to be protected 
and-his spouse, and if none, then his parent, must be served 
personally with notice of the proceedings at least ten days 
before the Bate 0£ the hearing if.they can be found within 
the state, and-if they cannot be found within the state, they 
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must be given notice in accordance with U.C.A., 75-1-401. 
That in the present instance, none of the notice provi-
sions pursuant to u.c.A., 75-5-405, nor U.C.A., 75-1-401, has 
been complied with, in that the Respondent submitted no proof 
of giving the required notice as required by U.C.A., 75-l-40l(c) (3). 
Further, that the appointment of a conservator is for 
the purpose of protecting disabled persons and/or minors, and 
the Appellant has not through an appropriate hearing been determined 
to be a "disabled person". 
That the Court did further enter such order for conservator-
ship without an application for the appointment of a conservator 
and such "conservatorship" must be obtained through appropriate 
legal proceedings, none of which are present in the instant 
case. 
The Colorado Court in Nelson vs. Nelson, 497 P.2d 1284 
(Colo., 1972) held that in a petition for appointment for recovery 
of property, a court may appoint a conservator only in accordance 
with the procedures prescribed by statute. 
IN IN RE: O'Hare's Guardianship 341 P.2d 205 (Utah, 19591'; 
the Utah Supreme Court held: 
"A mer~ allegation in a petition that a natural 
g.uardian is an unfit person does not prove the fact, 
nor does it prove that a minor child, the issue 
or such person, is either "neglected", "dependent", 
or "delinquent" as those words are construed, no:r;: . 
does it prove that the juvenile court h.as exclusive 
original jurisdiction with regard to custody". 
Therefore, the mere aliegations.of Respondent's attorney 
that the Appellant was unwilling to manage his property in 
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Davis County necessitates and should afford the Appellant 
with an opportunity to respond thereto. 
However in this instance the Appellant was not afforded 
such an opportunity and was thereby deprived of the fundamental 
rights incident to the taking of property without due process 
of law. 
POINT III 
THAT THE AUGUST 31, 1978, ORDER OF THE COURT IS 
WITHOUT COMPLIANCE WITH THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE GOVERNING SERVICE IN AMENDED PLEADINGS. 
That Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vides that pleadings asserting new or additional claims for 
relief against a Defendant shall be served upon such Defendant 
i~ the manner as provided for service of Summons under Rule 4 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
That the institution of a Lis Pendens and the appoint-
ment of a conservator is certainly a new and additional claim 
.for relief- by the Respondent and it is uncontroverted and 
admitted by the Respondent, that no service has been effectuated 
on the Appellant. 
_Therefore, the entry of the Order of -August 31,· 1978' · 
by_ 1;.he Court where no notice had been served on the Appellant, 
that such matters would be considered should be considered 
inval"id and the Court erred in considering and making 9.n Order 
regarding claims not properly before the Court. 
-8-
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POINT IV 
THAT ENTRY OF THE ORDER OF AUGUST 31, 1978, WITHOUT 
NOTICE DEPRIVED THE APPELLANT OF PROPERTY WITHOUT 
DUE PROCESS OF LAW. 
The Utah Supreme Court in McGrew v. Industrial Commission, 
85 P.2d 608 (1938), considered the term "property" under the 
Due Process clause of the Constitution. 
That the Utah Supreme Court in McGrew held: 
Property is the right of any person to possess, 
use, enjoy, ·and dispose of a thing. The 
term "property" is often used to indicate 
the res, or subject of the property rather 
than the property itself. Rigney v. Chicago, 
102 Ill. 64, 
77. "The words 'life', 'liberty', and 'property' 
are constitutional terms and are to be taken 
in their broad sense. They indicate the 
three great subdivisions of all civil rights. 
The term 'property' in this clause, embraces 
all valuable interest which a man may possess 
outsida.of ... himself,; that is to say, outside 
of his life and liberty. It is not confined 
to mere tangible property, but extends to 
every species of vested right." Campbell 
v. Holt , 115 U.S. 620, 6 Sup.Ct. 209, 214, 
29 L.E.d 483; The Board of Education v. 
Blodgett, 155 Ill. 441, 40 N.E., 1025.*** 
The Utah Supreme Court further held in the McGrew case, 
that certain other qualities relating to "property" which are 
fundamental include the right of the individual to use and enjoy 
su,ch property exclusively and the absolute _poWer to sell and 
dis~ose of such property. 
The Utah Supreme Court further in McGrew v. Industrial 
Commission incorporated the definition afforde_d "Due Process" 
by Mr. Justice Field in Hagel v. Reclamation District, 111.U.S. 
-9-
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701, 4 Sup.Ct. 663, 28 L.E.d. 569. 
Mr. Justice Field in Hagel case stated in defining 
"Due Process" as follows: 
It is sufficient to observe here that by 
"Due Process'' is meant one which, following 
the forms of law, is appropriate to the 
case, and just to the parties to be affected. 
It must be pursued in the ordinary mode 
prescribed by the law; it must be adapted 
to the end to be attained; and wherever 
it is necessary for the protection of the 
parties, it must give them an opportunity 
to be heard respecting the justice of the 
Judgment sought. The cause in question 
means, therefore, that there can be no proceeding 
against life, liberty, or property which 
may result in the deprivation of either, 
without the observance of those general 
rules established in our system of jurisprudence 
for the security of private rights. 
That in the instant case the Appellant was at no time 
given notice by the Respondent, that the realty upon which 
the -Lis Pendens was an issue. Therefore, the Appellant has 
been deprived of his property, in that said Appellant was not 
afforded the opportunity to be heard relative to such issue. 
Similarly, in Christiansen v. Harris, 153 P.2d 314, 
(1945}, the Utah Supreme Court again had the opportunity to 
- consider the -phrase, "Due Process of Law", and sets forth certain 
requirements which must be afforded an individual -of Due Process 
in civil case-s. 
__ The Utah Supreme Court in Christiansen held the essentials 
of Due Process are: 
-Ca·l The existence of a competent person, 
body, or agency authorized by law to determine 
the questions; 
-10-
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(b) An inquiry into the merits of the question 
by such person, body, or agency; 
(cl Notice to the person of the inauguration 
and purpose of the inquiry at a time at 
which such person should appear if he wishes 
to be heard; 
(d) The right to appear in person or by 
counsel; 
(el A fair opportunity to submit evidence, 
examine and cross-examine witnesses; 
(f) Judgment to be rendered upon the record 
thus presented. 
That in the instant case, the Appellant was not afforded 
the essentials of Due Process as set forth in (cl, (d}, (e}, 
and (f}. Set forth as essentials of Due Process in Christiansen 
supra. 
Consequently, the Appellant has wrongfully been deprived 
of his property without the fundalemtals of Due Process having 
been afforded to him. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant respectfully submits to this Honorable Court, 
that the failure of the Court to provide the Appellant with the 
foundational essentials of D~e Process has deprived the Appellant 
of pr0perty without Due Process of Law, -and especially so in 
light of the fact that the Appellant was not afforded notice, 
and the relief sought was not before the Lower Court either through 
a Petition or Order to Show Cause.Application. 
-11-
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The Appellant further respectfully submits that the 
Judgment and Order of the Lower Court should be reversed, the 
Lis Pendens removed and the Receivorship terminated until such 
time as the Appellant is afforded the essential prerequisites 
of Due Process. 
f b . d . :::-Yd f 'l 1979 Respect ully su mitte this · /L ay o Apr1 , . 
STEPHEN W. FARR 
Attorney f.or Appellant 
ONALD W. PERKINS 
Attorney for Appellant 
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